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AVOIDING THE PROTECTIONS OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: THE ANTI-
WAIVER PROVISIONS
Samuel H. Gruenbaum*
INTRODUCTION
Under section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act)' and section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), 2 any "condition, stipulation, or provision"
waiving compliance with any provision 3 of either Act is void.
The purpose of these sections is to protect investors.' At the
same time, however, the sections have limited application to
members of exchanges and broker-dealer associations.5 Most of
the cases that have dealt with these sections have involved the
validity of arbitration agreements involving investor claims
asserted under the provisions of the federal securities laws and
disputes by self-regulated registered broker-dealers.
The policy of encouraging the settlement of controversies
by arbitration is judicially favored as an expeditious means of
© 1979 by Samuel H. Gruenbaum.
* Associate, Loeb and Loeb, Los Angeles, California. Member, California Bar;
Certified Public Accountant; California Board member. Formerly an attorney with the
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.
1. Section 14 of the Securities Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be
void." Securities Act of 1933, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
2. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter
or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby
shall be void." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. 78cc (1976).
3. Pursuant to section 6 of the Exchange Act, an Exchange may be registered as
a National Securities Exchange, and, pursuant to sections 6 and 19 of the Exchange
Act, such an Exchange may propose, adopt, change, add, or delete its own rules.
Similarly, section 15 of the Exchange Act provides for the registration of an Association
of brokers and dealers as a National Securities Association (e.g., The National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, commonly referred to as the "NASD"), and sections 15 and
19 of the Exchange Act permit such an Association to propose, adopt, change, add, or
delete its own rules. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6, 15, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f,
78o, 78s (1976).
4. See generally A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38,
40 (1941); 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 130-31 (1961); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1813-14 (1961).
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(c), 78bb(b) (1976); S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 201.
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settling disputes.' However, since the United States Arbitra-
tion Act' was adopted prior to either of the Securities Acts, and
the earlier Act is not mentioned in either of the federal securi-
ties laws, it is doubtful that Congress intended to turn over the
adjudicatory authority over federal securities claims to private
arbitrators."
The issue was first raised in Wilko v. Swan,' where the
United States Supreme Court held an agreement to submit to
arbitration any future controversy that might arise between a
brokerage firm and its customer void under section 14, notwith-
standing the provisions of the Arbitration Act. More recently,
the Court, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., '0 held that an inter-
national business agreement containing an arbitration clause
was enforceable against a claim alleging violations of Rule 10b-
5 of the Exchange Act. In so holding, the Court declined to
apply the Wilko rationale under the particular circumstances.
Relying on the distinctions between Wilko and Scherk, as well
as other factors, the lower courts have generally limited the
application of sections 14 and 29(a). However, as will be dis-
cussed later in this article," the rationale for the limitations
has only facial appeal and is not firmly grounded in the reme-
dial scheme established by the federal securities laws. In every
case where claims subject to arbitration agreements or other-
wise involving some sort of deviation from judicial resolution
of the merits are intermixed with claims under the federal se-
curities laws, a tension will surface: Is the claimant entitled to
a judicial forum, or is the claim subject to contractual waiver
provisions that cut off judicial rights?
This article first focuses on the Wilko and Scherk decisions
in an effort to ascertain the scope of each decision, as well as
to examine the continued viability of Wilko after Scherk. Sec-
ondly, the applications of, and limitations placed on, sections
6. Chief Justice Burger recently reiterated the strong preference given arbitra-
tion by the judiciary. See Remarks of Chief Justice Burger, American Bar Association
Midyear Meeting (Feb. 12, 1978). See generally Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) where the court held that a plaintiff's
securities claims had to be stayed pending arbitration of the contract claims as "claims
under the Federal Securities Acts . . .are generally not subject to arbitration under a
pre-existing arbitration clause." Id. at 543; see also notes 71-83 and accompanying text
infra.
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1977).
8. See notes 49-50 infra.
9. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
10. 417 U.S. 506 (1974), reh. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1975).
11. See notes 84-90 and accompanying text infra.
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14 and 29(a) by the lower courts are examined. Finally, the self-
regulatory organization exception to the application of the
anti-waiver provisions is discussed to ascertain the scope of the
exception.
Wilko AND Scherk: COMPLEMENTARY OR CONTRADICTORY?
The United States Arbitration Act"2 provides that written
contractual provisions to settle controversies by arbitration
shall be "valid, irrevocable and enforceable."' 3 Congress has
stated that any suit or proceeding brought in a federal court
''upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration" must be stayed until such arbitra-
tion is completed." Upon application of an aggrieved party to
a court, if the making of the agreement or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall direct that arbitration
proceed in accordance with the agreement. 5 However, a court
will deny enforcement on "such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for revocation of any contract."' 6
The adoption of the Arbitration Act evidenced a congres-
sional preference for arbitration over litigation.'7 The benefits
sought to be achieved thereby were the avoidance of the com-
plexity, delay and expense of litigation.'" On the other hand,
the Securities Act was intended to protect the multitude of
investors who must necessarily rely on issuers and dealers in
securities to make full and fair disclosure concerning the char-
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1977).
13. Id. § 2.
14. Id. § 3.
15. Id. § 4.
16. Id. § 2.
17. 346 U.S. at 431-32; H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Seas. 1-2 (1924); S. REP.
No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924); see Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S.
263 (1932). The Arbitration Act reversed " centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements, [and] was designed . . . to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same
footing as other contracts.' "417 U.S. at 510-11; H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1924); see also S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924).
18. "The reports of both Houses on the Arbitration Act stress the need for avoid-
ing the delay and expense of litigation, and practice under its terms raises hopes for
its usefulness both in controversies based on statutes or on standards otherwise cre-
ated." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at 510. *
Other effects of submitting claims to arbitration are a reduction in the congestion
of the judicial system, and alleviation of the burdens placed on corporate executives
by the litigation process. These factors were among the policy considerations which led
the Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) to conclude
that standing in private damage actions under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder was limited to persons who actually purchased or sold securities.
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acter of the securities being sold." Issuers and dealers in securi-
ties typically have better access than buyers to information
concerning the business and opportunities of a company. 0 This
advantage is sought to be balanced by requiring full disclosure
to buyers. 21 Liability is provided for misstatements in the offer
and sale of securities, and fraud is prohibited."
19. 346 U.S. at 431; S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
20. 346 U.S. at 435.
21. Section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits the offer or sale of securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-state
commerce or of the mails unless a registration statement is on file with the SEC and
has become effective. Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1976). Section 8 of
the Act governs when a registration statement may become "effective" and provides
the Commission with the authority to issue a "stop order", upon notice and hearing,
when it appears that the registration statement contains material misstatements or
omissions. Securities Act of 1933, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1976). However, section 3 of
the Act exempts various securities, and section 4 exempts certain transactions, from
the prohibitions of section 5. Securities Act of 1933, § 3-5, 15 U.S.C. § 77c-77e
(1976).
22. Section 11(a) of the Securities Act creates civil liability for untrue statements
of, or omissions to state, material facts in a registration statement which has become
effective. Under this section, any person acquiring a security offered pursuant to such
a registration statement, unless it is proved that at the time of acquisition such person
knew of the untruth or omission, may sue to recover, at law or in equity, in any court
of competent jurisdiction. Section 11(b) of the Act provides for absolute liability of the
issuer, except to the extent that the issuer can affirmatively show that the damage to
the investor was not caused by the misstatement or omission in the registration state-
ment, section 11(e), and what has come to be known as a "due diligence" defense for
any other person against whom suit may be brought under section 11(a). Section 11(e)
governs the amount recoverable, and section 11(g) places a ceiling on such amount.
Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). The landmark cases dealing with
liability under section 11(a) and (b) and the due diligence defense are Escott v. Bar-
Chris Construction Corp., 283 F.Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Feit v. Leasco Data
Proc. Equip. Corp., 332 F.Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Section 12(1) of the Securities Act imposes civil liability for the offer or sale of a
security in violation of section 5, and section 12(2) imposes liability for misstatements
or omissions in a prospectus or oral communication. Under section 12, a purchaser may
sue any person who violates section 12(1) or (2), at law or in equity, in any court of
competent jurisdiction. Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
Section 13 of the Act sets a limitation on the time within which suit to enforce
any liability under sections 11 or 12 may be brought. Section 15 imposes civil liability
upon every person who controls any person liable under sections 11 or 12 if the control-
ling person has the requisite state of mind. Section 16 of the Act provides that the
rights and remedies provided by the Act are in addition to all rights that may exist at
law or in equity. Section 17(a) prohibits fraud in the offer or sale of any security.
Securities Act of 1933, §§ 13, 15-17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77m, 77o-77q (1976). While the
Supreme Court has expressly left open the question whether an implied private cause
of action for damages exists under section 17(a), International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 795 n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. at 733 n.6, such an action has been held to exist by the lower courts. Schaefer
v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1289, 1293 (7th Cir. 1975); Globus v.
Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-84 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
913 (1970). Section 24 of the Act makes a willful violation of the Act or any rule or
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Wilko v. Swan was the first major case to deal with the
tension created by an arbitration agreement that is "valid"
under the Arbitration Act, but which covers a claim that is
actionable under the remedial provisions of the Securities Act.
The suit was between a brokerage firm and its customer with
respect to a claim asserted by the customer under section 12(2)
of the Securities Act." The customer alleged that the brokerage
firm had, by means of false representations and omissions, in-
duced him to purchase certain securities which he later sold at
a loss.
The defendants sought to stay trial under section 3 of the
United States Arbitration Act,2' until arbitration could be had
pursuant to the terms contained in margin agreements entered
into by the customer with the brokerage firm .25 When the case
regulation thereunder a crime. Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1978).
Section 10(b) of Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder prohibit fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1976); 17 C.F.R. 240, 10b-5 (1972). The Supreme Court has held that an
implied private right of action for damages exists under the section and rule. Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act imposes liability upon every person who controls any person liable under
any provision, rule or regulation of the Exchange Act if the controlling person has the
requisite state of mind. Finally, section 32 of the Exchange Act makes a willful viola-
tion of the Act, or any rule or regulations thereunder, a crime. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 20, 32, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t, 78ff (1978).
23. Section 12 of the Securities Act imposes civil liability on any person who
offers or sells a security in violation of section 5 of the Act or by means of a prospectus
or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of, or omits to state, a
material fact. A purchaser who knows of the untruth or omission in the prospectus or
oral communication at the time he purchases is expressly precluded from the remedy
permitted by section 12(2). Further, the offeror or seller upon whom liability is sought
to be imposed has the burden of proving "that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known of such untruth or omission." Securities Act of
1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976). The effect of this provision is that the seller has the
burden of proving lack of scienter. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 431. Finally, section 12
expressly limits the amount recoverable by an aggrieved purchaser. Securities Act of
1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
24. Section 3 of the Arbitration Act provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon an issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writ-
ing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is refera-
ble to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the appli-
cant for the stay is not in default in proceedings with such arbitration.
Arbitration Act § 3, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. 1 1979).
25. 346 U.S. at 429. The district court denied the motion to stay, holding that
the arbitration agreement deprived the customer of the advantageous court remedy
provided by the Securities Act. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). A
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reached the Supreme Court, the issue at hand was "whether an
agreement to arbitrate a future controversy is a 'condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any se-
curity to waive compliance with any provision' of the Securities
Act which § 14 declares 'void'."" The Court's holding that such
an agreement was void by force of section 14 was based upon
its analysis of the conflicting policies underlying the Arbitra-
tion and Securities Acts," and the finding that section 12(2) of
the Securities Act affords a special right to injured investors
that cannot be waived by a prior agreement to submit a claim
which is actionable under section 12(2) to arbitration. Also, the
Court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the agree-
ment involved concerned an agreement to arbitrate a future
controversy.28
In dealing with the conflicting policies under these sepa-
rate Acts, the Wilko Court relied heavily on the congressional
intent underlying the Securities Act; i.e., investor protection.
The majority recognized that buyers of securities are typically
at a disadvantage, and it was "with an eye" to the disadvan-
tages that the Securities Act was drafted.29 The Court agreed
with the argument that section 14 was intended to preclude
sellers from maneuvering buyers into a position that weakens
their ability to recover under the Securities Act. 30
Considerable emphasis was placed on the special right af-
forded investors by section 12(2) of the Securities Act.' In this
regard, the Court noted that this special right differs substan-
tially from a common law action based on the same facts, in
that under section 12(2): the seller must prove lack of scienter;
the right is enforceable in state or federal court; removal from
state to federal court is prohibited; and, if suit is brought in
federal court, there is a wide choice of venue, nationwide serv-
ice of process, and no jurisdictional amount in controversy re-
quirement.2
divided court of appeals reversed, holding that the Securities Act did not prohibit an
agreement to arbitrate future controversies. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
26. 346 U.S. at 430.
27. Id. at 438. It should be noted that section 2 of the Arbitration Act and section
12 of the Securities Act both require that there be a nexus between the transaction
and interstate commerce. Arbitration Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 11979), Securities
Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. 771 (1976).
28. 346 U.S. at 430, 432, 438.
29. Id. at 435.
30. Id. at 432, 435.
31. Id. at 431, 435, 438.
32. Id. at 431. The provisions of the Securities Acts dealing with jurisdiction and
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The Court concluded that the agreement to arbitrate was
a "stipulation" within the meaning of section 14, and the right
to select the judicial forum was the kind of "provision" that
could not be waived under the section.3 However, the Court
was careful to point out that its analysis and holding were
limited to agreements entered into prior to the occurrence of
any violation or controversy arising from an alleged violation.3'
The rationale behind this limitation is that once a violation has
been committed, a subsequent agreement to resolve the claim
arising therefrom by arbitration does not entail a waiver of
compliance with the securities laws. The parties to the agree-
ment are each bound to comply with all of the provisions of the
securities laws prior to the occurrence of the violation, and the
subsequent agreement to arbitrate the resultant claim has no
affect on that obligation. It is only when the agreement is en-
tered into in advance of a violation that a party is effectively
required to waive a right that the law provides.35
Two decades passed before the Supreme Court again dis-
cussed the anti-waiver provisions. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co. involved a suit under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, for rescission of a purchase agree-
ment by which Alberto-Culver Co., an American corporation,
purchased the trademarks and stock of two foreign corpora-
tions. The suit also sought damages. 6 Alberto-Culver's claim
service of process are Securities Act of 1933, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976), and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). There is no juridictional
requirement as to the amount in controversy to invoke juridiction under either Act.
33. 346 U.S. at 434-35. The court in Wilko pointed out that even if the claim were
to be determined in arbitration, the arbitration agreement would not have relieved the
seller from liability or the burden of proof imposed by the Securities Act. In other
words, the provisions of the Securities Act would have applied in arbitration. Id. at
433 & n.18, 434-36, 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 435, 438.
35. Agreements to settle or arbitrate claims arising from violations which have
already occurred are not void under sections 14 and 291a). See Murtagh v. University
Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810, 816 (5th Cir. 1974); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co.,
453 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); Pearlstein v.
Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1968); see generally Note, 62 YALE L.J. 985, 994-
96 (1953).
36. 417 U.S. at 508-09, 521. Interestingly, the Court in Scherk did not concern
itself with the express remedy created by section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc (1976). That section provides that any contract made in violation of, or the
performance of which would violate any provision, rule or regulation of the Exchange
Act shall be void as regards the violator or his successor who takes with knowledge.
The courts have interpreted the section as providing the aggrieved party with the
option of invoking the right to rescission. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
1980]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
was based upon allegedly fraudulent representations concern-
ing the unencumbered status of the trademarks it had pur-
chased .3
The purchase agreement contained a clause providing that
"any contoversy or claim [arising] . . .out of this agreement
or the breach thereof. . . shall be settled by arbitration . 3 In
response to Alberto-Culver's claim, Scherk filed a motion to
stay the suit pending arbitration pursuant to the terms of the
agreement. Relying on Wilko as the controlling authority, the
district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. 9 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court
once again was faced with having to resolve the conflicting
policies underlying the Arbitration Act and the anti-waiver
provisions of the Securities Acts. On this occasion, however,
the issue was put in the context of an international commercial
transaction involving the purchase of securities, and a claim
asserted under the Exchange Act.
In holding that section 29(a) of the Exchange Act did not
operate to void the arbitration clause contained in the agree-
ment in Scherk, the Court relied primarily on the character of
the transaction involved-an international business transac-
tion. The Court reasoned that considerable uncertainty, confu-
sion and lack of predictability in international business trans-
actions would follow from application of United States laws to
such transactions where the parties had, beforehand, mutually
agreed upon the forum and laws to be applied in the event of a
controversy.10 As Justice Stewart stated in his majority opin-
ion:
375, 387 (1970); Occidental Life Ins. Co. of N.C. v. Pat Ryan and Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d
1255 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974). At least one court has held
that the aggrieved party has the absolute right to rescission under section 29(b), even
after performance has been rendered. Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc.,
391 F.2d 357, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1968). However, such a construction of the section has
been criticized as "draconian" and "devastating" and has not been followed by other
courts. See, Occidental Life Ins. Co. of N.C. v. Pat Ryan and Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d at
1265; Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
37. 417 U.S. at 509.
38. Id. at 508 n.1.
39. Id. at 510.
40. Id. at 515-19. Relying on The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972), the Court in Scherk stated that invalidation of the arbiration agreement would
"reflect a 'parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts. . . .We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and interna-
tional waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts."' 417 U.S. at 519, quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. at 9.
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A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce
an international arbitration agreement would not only
frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and
mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
tactical litigation advantages.
[Tihe dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land
would surely damage the fabric of international commerce
and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of busi-
nessmen to enter into international commercial agree-
ments.'
Thus, on a policy level, the Supreme Court in Scherk held that
the principles and stability of international business override
a strict application of section 29(a) of the Exchange Act. Pre-
sumably, the conclusion would be no different if the applica-
tion of section 14 of the Securities Act were at issue, since its
terms are almost identical to the terms of section 29(a).42
However, the Court in Scherk does not appear to have
limited its rationale to "truly international transactions." On
the contrary, it implied rather strongly that its holding applied
to transactions having fewer foreign contacts than the transac-
tion in Scherk. It must be noted that the transaction in Scherk
had only the slightest contact with the United States. The
negotiations to purchase the trademarks and stock, with very
limited exceptions, and the actual operations of the businesses
acquired, were all conducted and located in Europe. Justice
Douglas (in a dissenting opinion) expressed a concern that,
under the majority's holding, parties to transactions which
have significant contacts with the United States, unlike
Scherk, and only slight contacts with foreign countries, could
invoke the "talisman" of "international contact,' 3 and thus
avoid the application of Wilko. The majority responded to this
concern by stating: "Concededly, situations may arise where
However, where the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract is the product of
fraud or coercion, the clause is not enforceable. 417 U.S. at 519 n.14; cf. Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
41. 417 U.S. at 516-17.
42. See id. at 515. "The Act of 1934, accordingly, as indicated, is supplementary
to that of 1933, except in its judicial remedy, and accordingly, the same logic is appli-
cable to the Act of 1934, as is applicable to that of 1933, and, therefore, to both non-
waiver sections." Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d at 245. See
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 723 (10th Cir. 1978).
43. 417 U.S. at 528-29 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the contacts with foreign countries are so insignificant or
attenuated that the holding in Wilko would meaningfully
apply."" The implication from this response is that transac-
tions which have only slight contacts with foreign countries will
not be subject to the holding of Wilko. Rather, only when the
contacts are "so insignificant or attenuated" will Wilko apply."5
Under such an interpretation, the breadth of Wilko is severely
limited.
In addition to the policy rationale, the Court in Scherk
distinguished Wilko on the ground that Scherk did not involve
the "special right" of a private remedy as Wilko did." In this
regard, the Court reasoned that the "provision" relied upon in
Wilko-allowing a plaintiff to bring suit in state or federal
court-had no counterpart in the Exchange Act. This seems to
suggest that certain types of agreements that might be void
under section 14 might not be void under section 29(a), and
that Wilko should not apply to cases involving section 29(a) of
the Exchange Act. However, it is important to point out that
the Court in Scherk preceded this analysis by characterizing it
as only a "colorable argument."' 7 This characterization may
have been a result of the Court's apparent disbelief that section
10(b) applied to the facts of the case at all."8 Nonetheless, it
44. Id. at 517 n.l (emphasis added); but see Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 1977).
45. 417 U.S. at 517.
46. Id. at 513.
47. Id. Lower courts have considered these two provisions to be counterparts and
have construed them to forbid the same kinds of contractual provisions. Moran v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d at 245; Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache &
Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 n.5 (2d Cir. 1966); Special Trans. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F.
Supp. 1185, 1187 (D. Minn. 1971).
48. In this regard, the Court raised several issues suggesting that section 10(b)
did not apply to the facts of the case. First, the Court questioned whether Alberto-
Culver's "acquisition of Scherk's business was a security transaction within the mean-
ing of § 10(b) . . . and Rule 10b-5." Id. at 514 n.8. Second, the Court acknowledged
the existence of the issue of whether the federal securities laws apply at all to an
international transaction of the kind involved. Id. at 516 n.9, 518 n.12. Third, the Court
appears to have been of the view that Congress' passage of chapter 2 of the United
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976), to implement the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted by the United
Nations Economic and Social Council, June 10, 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997
(1970), superceded the application of the federal securities laws to international arbi-
tration agreements. 417 U.S. at 520 n.15. In this regard, the Court said:
Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from
the considerations expressed in this opinion, would require of its own
force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present case, we
think that this country's adoption and ratification of the Convention and
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would not be unreasonable to argue that the exclusive
jurisdiction granted to the federal courts by section 27 of the
Exchange Act amounts to the creation of a "special right"
which is at least as important as the special right referred to
in Wilko. Indeed, Congress' vesting exclusive jurisdiction over
Exchange Act claims in the federal courts would seem to make
the right created thereby more "special" than the right created
by the concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction provided
for in the Securities Act.
Finally, the fact that the Arbitration Act was passed by
Congress in 192411-prior to the passage of the Securities Acts
in 1933 and 1934-is strong reason for strictly applying the
provisions of the Securities Acts when they conflict with the
provisions of the Arbitration Act. Despite the existence of the
Arbitration Act at the time that the Securities Acts were de-
bated and passed, Congress chose to omit any reference to
arbitration in sections 14 and 29(a), or for that matter, in the
jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Acts.10 Arguably, this
should prohibit any court from remanding a claim arising
under the Securities Acts to an arbitral forum when to do so
would contravene the express provisions of sections 14 and
29(a). If Congress had intended to permit the remanding of
such claims to arbitration, it could have done so expressly.
APPLICATION OF AND LIMITATIONS ON THE ANTI-WAIVER PROVISIONS
Relatively few lower court decisions have dealt with sec-
tions 14 and 29(a) and their application under Wilko and
Scherk. Those courts that have dealt with these issues have
the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act provide
strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent with the
decision we reach today.
Id. (emphasis added).
49. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924). The Arbitration Act provides that agreements to arbitrate
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Clearly, the express
terms of section 14 and 29(a) are "grounds as exist at law ... for the revocation" of a
contract to arbitrate claims arising under the provisions of the federal securities laws.
Id. §§ 14, 29(a).
50. Section 22(a) of the Securities Act vests jurisdiction of claims brought under
that Act in both state and federal courts. Securities Act of 1933, § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. §
77v (1976). Section 27 of the Exchange Act vests exclusive jurisdiction of claims arising
under the Act in the federal courts. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1976). No reference is made to any other jurisdictional forum for private
actions.
See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979) (Wilko
inapplicable to pendant state law actions that may be referred to arbitration unless
the federal actions "contain substantially the same elements as the state law claims."
Id. at 1030.).
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generally been unwilling to interpret the voiding provisions as
broadly as they are written, and have tended to restrict the
application of Wilko to cases where the parties do not have
equal bargaining power. This trend, and the Burger Court's
apparent inclination to restrict the scope of the federal securi-
ties laws," suggests that sections 14 and 29(a), and Wilko, will
be of limited utility to investors in the future. This result is
unfortunate since it goes far toward vitiating a protection that
Congress intended to provide. As the Court said in Wilko:
As the protective provisions of the Securities Act [and,
presumably, the Exchange Act] require the exercise of
judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness, it
seems to us that Congress must have intended §14 [and
§29(a)] . . . to apply to waiver of judicial trial and re-
view.5"
The vestiges of hope that remain for the viability of sections 14
and 29(a) appear to be in the argument that they were intended
to protect the small investor, and preclude prior agreements to
submit claims arising under the federal securities laws to deci-
sional forums outside of those expressly provided for in the
Securities Acts.
51. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S.Ct. 790 (1979)
(involuntary non-contributory pension plan is not a "security"); SEC v. Sloan, 436
U.S. 103 (1978) (limitation on SEC's right to suspend trading in registered securities
for more than ten days); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (breach
of fiducuiary duty, absent fraud or deception, is not actionable under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated tender offeror
does not have standing to bring an implied private right of action under section 14(e));
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required in private damage
actions under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only actual purchasers and sellers have standing to bring an
implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
52. 346 U.S. at 437; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at 525 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); cf. Note, 41 GEO. L.J. 565 (1953); Note, 62 YALE L.J. 985 (1953); The same
logic is applicable to sections 14 and 29(a). Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
389 F.2d at 245.
53. The intent of the arbitration process is to bring finality to a dispute. How-
ever, the issue of whether a given controversy is covered by an arbitration clause is a
matter of interpretation and construction, governed by federal law. Further, it is
"federal policy to construe liberally arbitration clauses, to find that they cover disputes
reasonably contemplated by this lnguage, and to resolve doubts in favor of arbitra-
tion." Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 385 (2d Cir.
1961).
Once a claim has been arbitrated, there is little that can be done to open it up for
judicial review. There are, however, circumstances under which arbitral finality may
be challenged. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Gas Co., 393
U.S. 145 (1968); Torrington v. Metal Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966);
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In Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.," the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dealt with
an action brought by a customer under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder,55 against a large
broker-dealer firm. In upholding the district court's denial of
the broker-dealer firm's motion to stay the customer's action
pending arbitration pursuant to the terms of a Standard Op-
tion Agreement signed by the customer, the court of appeals
held Wilko to be controlling on policy grounds. First, it distin-
guished Scherk on the ground that its application was limited
to international agreements. 6 Second, the court placed consid-
erable emphasis on the "bargaining posture" of the parties. In
this regard, much reliance was placed on Justice (then Judge)
Stevens' analysis in his court of appeals dissent in Scherk57 that
the "holding in Wilko was directed at protecting . .. the
relatively uninformed individual investor.' ,,5 Weissbuch found
the disparity in bargaining power of the parties to be a signifi-
cant factor in arriving at its conclusion. It reasoned that unlike
Scherk, where both parties possessed formidable financial
Moss, The Fate of Arbitration in the Supreme Court: An Examination, 9 Loy. CI.
L.J. 369, 384 (1978); Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing
Problems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 936 (1976).
There are "fundamental and important differences between litigation in a court
and arbitration." Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532,
536 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976); see, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350
U.S. 198, 203 & n.4 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 435-37 (1953).
54. 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
55. Counts II and III of the complaint alleged common law fraud and deceit, and
breach of contract. These claims were arbitrable pursuant to the arbitration clause
contained in the Standard Option Agreement signed by the customer, but were stayed
by the district court pending its determination of the Rule lob-5 claim in Count I. Rule
lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exhange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1977).
56. 558 F.2d at 834.
57. 484 F.2d 611, 617 (1973), reversed on other grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
58. 558 F.2d at 835.
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strength, Wilko and Weissbuch each involved an individual
investor pitted against a large brokerage firm."
While the logic of this reasoning is appealing, it is falla-
cious. It ignores the dictate of the Supreme Court that "[tJo
decide issues of law on the size of the person who gets advan-
tage or claims disadvantage is treacherous."10 As Justice Doug-
las, directly confronting this point, said in his Scherk dissent:
The [Exchange] Act does not speak in terms of
"sophisticated" as opposed to "unsophisticated" people
dealing in securities. The rules when the giants play are
the same as when the pygmies enter the market ....
Congress has specified a precise way whereby big.and
small investors and the rules under which [large and so-
phisticated companies] of this Nation shall operate. They
or their lawyers cannot waive those statutory conditions,
for our corporate giants are not principalities of power
61
Finally, Weissbuch rejected the argument that a judicially
implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 is different
than the "special right" emphasized in Wilko and that, there-
fore, Wilko should not apply to an action arising under Rule
10b-5. In this regard, the court of appeals relied on the Third
Circuit's decision in Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc.,"2 which concluded that the differences in rights
created by the Securities Act and the Exchange Act do not
warrant such a distinction."3
Ayres also made two other important points. First, it im-
plicitly reasoned that the "purpose" of an arbitration clause
should be discerned so as to evaluate its applicability to a claim
arising under the provisions of the federal securities laws."4 If
the clause in question was intended to govern a different area
than the federal securities laws claim alleged, then it should
not be applicable in that case." This rationale finds some ana-
59. Id.
60. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 753 (1947).
61. 417 U.S. at 527-28. See also Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973).
62. 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
63. 538 F.2d at 536; accord, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Moore, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 723 (10th Cir. 1978);
but see notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
64. 538 F.2d at 536; see Zapach v. Elkins, Morris, Stroud & Co., 375 F. Supp.
669, 672 (M.D. Penn. 1973).
65. Ayres involved a registered representative (RR) employed by Merrill Lynch
who had acquired 8,000 shares of Merrill Lynch common stock. At the time, Merrill
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logical support in the holding in Scherk. Recall that the Court
there, in upholding the arbitration clause, placed overwhelm-
ing emphasis on the international character of the transaction
involved and the need to preserve orderliness and predictabil-
ity in international commercial transactions." The arbitration
clause was viewed as a means of achieving that end. It could
be argued that just as the overriding "purpose" of the clause
in Scherk governed its applicability in that case, so must an
absence of such purpose behind a given clause preclude its
applicability.
The second important point made in the Ayres decision is
in its emphasis on Wilko's conclusion that "prospective waivers
of the right to judicial trial and review [are] inconsistent with
Congress' overriding concern for the protection of investors.""
In view of the importance placed on congressional intent in
recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the federal securi-
ties laws," this point takes on added importance. Further, in
response to the argument that Wilko does not apply to judi-
Lynch was a privately held corporation. Pursuant to an option agreement entered into
between the RR and Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch exercised its right to repurchase the
8,000 shares when the RR retired. Unbeknownst to the RR, Merrill Lynch was in the
midst of planning a public offering of its stock at a price substantially higher than the
option price at which it purchased the 8,000 shares. The RR sued Merrill Lynch under
section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and state law, alleging that had he known of Merrill Lynch's
plans to make the public offering, he would have postponed his retirement and
thereby avoided the triggering of the option repurchase right. Merrill Lynch moved
for a stay of the RR's claim pending arbitration, arguing that New York Stock Ex-
change Rule 347(b), by which it and the RR were bound, subjected any claims arising
out of employment or termination of employment to compulsory arbitration.
The court of appeals examined the purpose of Rule 347(b), and found that it
related to the "exchange's houskeeping affairs" and dealt primarily with "the area of
wage claims." 538 F.2d at 536. It then said:
Our conclusion that Exchange Rule 347(b) is inapplicable here is
buttressed by the fact that even if Exhange Rule 347(b) was intended to
govern controversies such as this, we believe it would, in any event, be
unenforceable and invalid as applied to this case [by the force of Wilhol.
Id. (emphasis added). See generally Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21, 24-
27 (2d Cir. 1974). However, the issue of whether a given controversy is covered by an
arbitration clause is a matter of interpretation and construction, and is therefore
governed by federal law. Further, it is "federal policy to construe liberally arbitration
clauses, to find that they cover disputes reasonably contemplated by this language,
and to resolve doubts in favor of arbitration." Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal
Constr. Co., 287 F.2d at 385.
66. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
67. 538 F.2d at 536; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 437; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. at 512.
68. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S.Ct. 242
(1979); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft,
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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cially implied causes of action under the Exchange Act," Ayres
noted "that Congress appears to have accepted the view that
Wilko v. Swan applies in the 10b-5 context."70
In dealing with cases involving multiple cause of action,
where some counts are alleged under the federal securities laws,
the courts have been inclined to carefully distinguish between
the securities and non-securities claims, and then apply the
anti-waiver provisions only to the securities claims. For exam-
ple, in Sibley v. Tandy Corp.,7 plaintiff, who was the repre-
sentative of the shareholders of the acquired and disappearing
company to a merger, brought suit against the acquiring and
surviving company alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 in connection with the merger agreement, and also alleg-
ing claims grounded in contract with respect to the merger
agreement.72 The district court declined to sever the contract
counts and to submit them to arbitration, reasoning that they
were too intertwined with the securities law claims. The court
of appeals, however, reversed and held that the counts should
have been severed, and that the non-securities counts should
have been submitted to and decided in arbitration prior to
resolution of the securities claims.
74
The court of appeals first carefully distinguished between
the securities and contract claims." The court next analyzed
the logical order in which proof of each of the claims would
have to proceed. In this regard, it reasoned that the contract
counts would have to be resolved first since they involved an
interpretation of the agreement between the parties, and the
securities fraud claims would have to follow since their viabil-
ity was dependent upon the court's construction of the terms
of the contract under the contract claims."
After examining the transaction in light of these factors,
the court in Sibley concluded that the contract and securities
claims were not so intertwined as to prohibit severance. In
severing the counts, the court ordered that the contract claims
69. See notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra.
70. 538 F.2d at 536-37; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111,
reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 321, 342.
71. 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. Id. at 542.
73. Id. at 543.
74. Id. at 544.
75. Id. at 543-44.
76. Id.
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be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the agreement of the
parties and that resolution of the securities claims be stayed
pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings." Subse-
quently, if the contract were construed in the manner con-
tended by plaintiff, there would be no basis for the securities
fraud claims since these claims were based on an alternative
ground that construed the merger agreement in accordance
with the defendant's contentions.
The rationale applied in Sibley is sensible and should be
followed. As stated earlier, arbitration is a favored means of
resolving disputes." It should not be circumvented or avoided
absent compelling reasons. To do so would be inconsistent with
the express provisions of the Arbitration Act. However, the
courts should be careful in severing claims and submitting
them to arbitration. Not all cases permit arbitration as the
complexity of the factual setting may result in too great of an
overlap between claims." Under circumstances where the non-
securities claims are so intertwined with the securities claims
that a factual resolution of the non-securities claims would, in
effect, result in a factual resolution of the securities claims,
severance and submission to arbitration would, in effect,
amount to a violation of sections 14 and 29(a) and their inter-
pretation under Wilko." Indeed, the court in Sibley recognized
this position and clearly stated that claims should not be se-
vered in such cases. 8"
The court in Sibley also pointed out that in cases where
counts are severable, resolution of the non-securities claims
will not always come before resolution of the securities claims.2
Instead, the nature of the claims, their interrelationship with
one another and their interdependency will be controlling in
determining which is decided first. If resolution of the non-
77. Id. at 544.
78. See notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
79. Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. Jaslow,
320 F. Supp. 98, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215,
220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); see Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103
(2d Cir. 1970).
80. See cases cited in note 79 supra.
81. 543 F.2d at 543; see cases cited in note 79 supra.
82. 543 F.2d at 544 n.6; see Frier Indus., Inc. v. Glickman [1974-1975 Transfer
Binderi FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). "Moreover, if the claims
are factually and legally independent, the court may allow both the arbitration pro-
ceedings and the trial of the securities law claim to go forward simultaneously." 543
F.2d at 544 n.6; see, e.g., Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hamill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 31
(E.D. Cal. 1974).
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securities claims would, in effect, require a factual determina-
tion of the securities claims, then the former should be stayed
pending resolution of the latter.1
3
In addition to dealing with the issue of the applicability of
sections 14 and 29(a) to an alleged waiver in a given case, the
viability of the waiver should also be examined under other
applicable legal principles. In this regard, the voluntariness
and knowledge with which a waiver was made will have a bear-
ing on its viability. As the Fifth Circuit said:
[J]udicial hostility toward waivers of statutory rights re-
quires that the right to private suit extended by the securi-
ties laws for alleged violations be scrupulously preserved
against unintentional or involuntary relinquishment."4
Thus, if a waiver were made unintentionally or involuntarily,
it might be void in the first instance, and there would be no
need to test its viability under the anti-waiver provisions of the
Securities Acts. Similarly, under general principles of contract
law, agreements entered into involuntarily or by fraud may be
avoided .85
[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitra-
tion clause itself-an issue which goes to the "making" of
the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed
to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not per-
mit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the
inducement of the contract generally."
There is nothing in the Securities Acts which compels in-
jured parties "to seek their remedies only through litigation." 7
However, when the right to do so is effectively waived by a prior
agreement, there exist other bases in state and federal law
under which the "agreement" can be overcome without consid-
ering sections 14 or 29(a). 8 Finally, even if a waiver is know-
83. See, e.g., Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d at 1103-04.
84. Murtagh v. Univ. Computing Co., 490 F.2d at 816; see Pearlstein v. Scudder
& German, 429 F.2d at 1143; Fischer v. New York Stock Exchange, 408 F. Supp. 745,
749 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Cohen v. Tenney Corp., 318 F. Supp. 280, 283-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). See also Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949).
85. See, e.g., note 40 supra.
86. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
87. Murtagh v. Univ. Computing Co., 490 F.2d at 816; see Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. at 438; Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d at 245-46.
88. See Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d at 537;
Murtagh v. Univ. Computing Co., 490 F.2d at 516; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 45, 56-59 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
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ingly and intentionally made, a court may refuse to recognize
it on the basis that is does not achieve a desirable end that is
compatible with the broad purposes of the federal securities
laws."9 The rationale underlying this position is that a party
should not e permitted by a prior agreement to defeat the
protections that Congress intended to provide by its enactment
of the Securities Acts.
It does seem illogical and unnecessary, however, to un-
qualifiedly prohibit parties from knowingly agreeing in ad-
vance to submit future claims to arbitration. The prohibition
makes sense when viewed from the perspective of an unwary
investor who signs a standard margin or other account agree-
ment full of fine print restrictions and limitations.. The major-
ity of the cases dealing with the anti-waiver provisions have
involved individual investors who apparently had little, if any,
appreciation for the potential consequences of their agree-
ments. The investor typically is not aware of all the ramifica-
tions of what he is doing," and as a practical matter, has little
say in the matter. When a subsequent controversy develops,
the investor will either proceed blindly in accordance with what
he believes to be a binding and enforceable agreement, or com-
plain and seek judicial relief from what he, at that point, per-
ceives to be an unjust predicament. Under these circumstan-
ces, it is quite sensible to hold that a prior agreement to arbi-
trate a future controversy is void.
89. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
90. Indeed, in a recent release the SEC urged broker-dealers to set forth in
standard customer agreements that agreements to arbitrate future controversies may
be void. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15984 (July 2, 1979), [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,122. In the release, the Commission concluded:
The Commission is especially concerned that arbitration clauses con-
tinue to be part of form agreements widely used by broker-dealers, de-
spite the number of cases in which these clauses have been held to be
unenforceable in whole or in part. Requiring the signing of an arbitration
agreement without adequate disclosure as to its meaning and effect vio-
lates standards of fair dealing with customers and constitutes conduct
that is inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. In addi-
tion, it may raise serious questions of compliance with the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws.
Commissioner Karmel dissented from the Commission's statement, arguing that the
use of arbitration agreements does not raise questions under the anti-fraud provisions.
Further, to the extent that arbitration clauses in standard customer agreements do not
comport with just and equitable principles of trade by broker-dealers, Commissioner
Karmel contended that the changes should have been directed to the Securities Indus-
try Conference on Arbitration or the appropriate self-regulatory organization for con-
sideration.
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However, when the parties to a contract know and fully
appreciate the potential consequences of their agreement to
arbitrate or otherwise resolve future controversies, it seems
highly inappropriate to prohibit them from doing so. An in-
formed decision to waive certain avenues of relief in the event
of a future disagreement should be binding as part of a
bargained-for package of rights and duties. Such an agreement
does not relieve either of the parties from complying with the
law. Instead, it limits their avenues of relief when a disagree-
ment arises. When the limitation is knowingly imposed as part
of an agreed-upon exchange, the courts should not intervene
and adjust the agreement.
An additional consideration pertinent to the application of
sections 14 and 29(a) is the timeliness with which a claim is
brought, or the concept of laches. In Rule 10b-5 cases seeking
rescission, the timely filing of a claim is a prerequisite to recov-
ery." This principle has also been applied to Securities Act
section 12 and section 17 cases. 2 While neither section 14 nor
section 29(a) speak of any limitations period, the principle
applicable in Rule 10b-5 rescission cases has been applied to
the anti-waiver provisions.'3 However, it seems rather incon-
gruous to say that an agreement is "void," presumably ab
initio, if a party seeks to enforce its provisions on a timely
91. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 740 n.15 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968), wherein the Court of Appeals said:
The logic of this rule is particularly compelling when the property in
dispute consists of stocks or fungibles of fluctuating value. A party could
otherwise sit back without notification to the wrongdoer, and, within the
allowable period to sue, watch the market go up or down, thereby specu-
lating on the success or value at the total risk of the wrongdoer ....
Although the law does not favor a wrongdoer, neither does it promote
speculative damages at his expense.
See also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 916 n.12 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 916, (1974); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th
Cir. 1962); Gannett Co. v. Register Publishing Co., 428 F. Supp. 818, 828 (D. Conn.
1977); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975).
92. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d
912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Straley v. Universal Uranium &
Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961).
"A corporation is prohibited by Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 from waiving compliance with any of the provisions of the Act .... " Allied
Artists Pictures Corp. v. Giroux, 312 F. Supp. 450, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This has been
held to be particularly true under section 16(b) for recovery of short-swing profits made
by an officer or director. Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (E.D. La. 1952).
93. Gannett Co. v. Register Publishing Co., 428 F. Supp. 818 (D. Conn. 1979).
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basis, and to say that it is not so void when a party delays in
asserting its terms. The agreement is either void or valid. If a
party delays unnecessarily in asserting the voidness of the
agreement, the court should adjust the rights of the parties by
applying principles of equity, but it should not make a void
agreement valid.
Before leaving this area, one final point is worth noting; it
concerns contractual acknowledgement of nonreliance by ei-
ther or both parties to a transaction. The acknowledgement
may appear in a contract and, for example, state that party A
is not relying on the representations or obligations of party B
in entering into the contract or transaction. Semantically, this
would not be a "waiver," and, therefore, the voiding provisions
of sections 14 and 29(a) would be inapplicable. However, at
least one court has held that such a provision is, in effect, the
equivalent of a waiver, and therefore subject to the voiding
provisions of sections 14 and 29(a)." The Court in Wilko came
to the same conclusion in dictum. 5 Such regard for substance
over form is sound. A party should not be permitted to do
indirectly that which he may not do directly.
EXCEPTIONS FOR SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS
An exception to the voiding provisions of sections 14 and
29(a) has been created by section 28(b) of the Exchange Act."1
The purpose of section 28(b) is to promote the self-regulatory
functions of the securities exchanges. 7 This purpose has been
94. Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 267 (1st Cir. 1966).
95. 346 U.S. at 434.
96. Section 28(b) provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to modify existing law with
regard to the binding effect (1) on any member of or participant in any
self-regulatory organization of any action taken by the authorities of such
organization to settle disputes between its members or participants, ...
or (3) of any section described in paragraph (1) . . . on any person who
has agreed to be bound thereby.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3), (a)(24) (1976).
This section was amended by section 21(1) of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1976)). The
principal effect of the amendment was to expand the reach of section 28(b) to apply
to all self-regulatory organizations and municipal securities brokers and dealers (refer-
ence to which is contained in subpart (2) of section 28(b) and is omitted from the
quoted portion of the section above). Prior to the 1975 amendment, the only reference
in section 28(b) to securities organizations was to "exchanges." The terms "member"
and "participant" are defined in sections 3(a)(3) and 3(a)(24) of the Exchange Act.
97. Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 840-41 (2d Cir.
1971).
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exhibited in three areas: prescribing mandatory arbitration
rules, developing constitutions and viewing both of the federal
securities acts as one overall scheme of regulation.
The section 28(b) exception has been developed as follows.
First, the phrase, "action taken by the authorities. . . to settle
disputes between members or participants," has been con-
strued to include Exchange "action" in prescribing mandatory
arbitration rules applicable to Exchange members." Therefore,
an Exchange rule compelling a member or participant to arbi-
trate is "action taken by the authorities." Second, members
and participants of self-regulatory organizations typically
must, as a pre-condition for admission, agree to be governed by
the constitution and rules of the organization that usually in-
clude compulsory arbitration." Consequently, members and
participants of self-regulatory organizations are bound to arbi-
trate pursuant to the constitution and rules of such organiza-
tions, and secton 28(b) precludes anything in the Exchange Act
from modifying this.
On the rationale that the Exchange Act establishes a
"statutory scheme of supervised self-regulation,"'00 section
28(b) has been held to preserve Exchange arbitration rules and
requirements notwithstanding section 29(a) and Wilio.""1 Sec-
tion 28(b)
involves control of exchange markets by requiring or per-
mitting national securities exchanges to adopt rules gov-
erning their practices and procedures and the business
conduct of their members, and in each case imposes the
responsibility for enforcement of these rules on the ex-
changes themselves."21
And, as one court has stated:
98. Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d at 538; see
Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d at 841; Brown v. Gilligan, Will
& Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 774 & n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); cf. Daniel v. Board of Trade of
Chicago, 164 F.2d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 1947); Crowley v. Commodity Exchange, 141 F.2d
182 (2d Cir. 1944).
99. See New York Stock Exchange Constitution, art. VIII, § 1; American Stock
Exchange Constitution, art. VIII, § 1; New York Stock Exchange Rule 347(b).
100. 451 F.2d at 840; Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d at 1214; SEC,
REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETSO H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. IV, 692-728 (1963); see Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d at 181,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341,
352 (1963).
101. See Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d at 1213-14.
102. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., Ist Sess. pt. I, 3 (1963).
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[Tihe arbitration clause contained in the New York Stock
Exchange Constitution is precisely the kind of self-
regulatory provision called for by the 1934 Act. Instead of
violating the policy behind the Act, .... arbitration in this
case furthers that policy. 03
This rationale seems sound as the legislative policy of protect-
ing investors, a matter that had significant bearing on the out-
come in Wilko,1'0 will not be adversely affected by compelling
members and participants of self-regulatory organizations to
arbitrate. 05
It might be pointed out that the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), which was established to create a
self-policing body among brokers and dealers,' 0" in 1968,
adopted a Code of Arbitration that provides for arbitration
between a member and a customer if the customer so
demands.07 This arbitration, if demanded, takes priority over
section 29(a).108 Based on the success of this procedure, the
SEC has proposed establishment of a uniform system for reso-
lution of disputes between investors and their broker-dealers.' °"
While the Securities Act has no counterpart to section
28(b) of the Exchange Act, it has been held that the exception
created by section 28(b) is applicable to claims arising under
the Securities Act and to which section 14 of that Act applies.10
The rationale behind this conclusion is that the Securities Acts
must be read together as invoking an overall scheme of regula-
tion, and that the ends sought to be achieved by section 28(b)
of the Exchange Act should not be defeated simply because a
given set of facts is alleged to have violated a provision of the
Securities Act rather than the Exchange Act."' In this regard,
103. Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d at 1214; Axelrod & Co. v. Kor-
dich, Victor, & Neufeld, 451 F.2d at 841; Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp.
at 733-75.
104. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra.
105. See Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d at 843; Coenen
v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d at 1214.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-78o-4 (1976).
107. NASD Code of Arbitration, § 2(a)(2); see Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Inc. v.
Rowady, 437 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
108. Financial House, Inc. v. Otten, 369 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
109. See SEC Release No. 34-12528 (June 9, 1976); Release No. 34-12974 (Nov.
15, 1976); Release No. 34-13470 (April 26, 1977).
110. See Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor, & Neufeld, 451 F.2d at 843; Brown
v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. at 775. See generally Ayres v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d at 538-39.
111. See Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor, & Neufeld, 451 F.2d at 843; 3 Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1814 n.430 (1961).
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the Third Circuit noted that "the same logic is applicable to
the Act of 1934, as is applicable to that of 1933, and, therefore,
to both non-waiver sections.""'
As appealing as this rationale may seem, it is not appropri-
ate. While the Securities Acts may be viewed together as one
overall scheme of regulation, they are separate legislative Acts
and were intended to cure, to some degree, different sorts of
evils. The Securities Act was intended to provide full and fair
disclosure in the offer and sale of securities; the Exchange Act
was intended to deal with deceptive and unfair securities trad-
ing practices, incomplete and misleading information to pur-
chasers, sellers and owners of securities, and the regulation of
credit in the securities markets. An intent to provide a system
of self-regulation is nowhere found in the Securities Act, except
in the argument that is should be read together with the Ex-
change Act. From an overall regulatory perspective, such a
reading may be desirable. However, to carry it to the next step
and incorporate a provision of the Exchange Act into the Secur-
ities Act seems to go too far. Congress was perfectly capable of
doing so, and where it obviously did not, the courts should not.
CONCLUSION
Sections 14 and 29(a) provide important protections for
investors. They should be broadly construed to the extent nec-
essary to fulfill their purpose. The sections are intended to
prohibit agreements and stipulations that permit parties to
avoid compliance with the provisions, rules and regulations of
the federal securities laws. The courts have construed this pur-
pose to preclude prior agreements to resolve future disputes
that would be actionable under the securities laws in a manner
other than as expressly provided in the Securities Acts." 3 In
addition, the courts have shown a preference for broadly
construing these sections in cases where individual investors
have been pitted against large corporate concerns.
The principles enunciated in this article offer an approach
that is consistent with the remedial purposes of the Securities
Acts while, at the same time adhering to congress' intent as
expressly set forth in the Acts. Although the waiver of the
112. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, [1979 Transfer
Binder I FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96, 723 (10th Cir. 1978); Moran v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d at 245.
113. Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 304 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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obligation to comply with the securities laws should be prohib-
ited in all cases, knowing and reasoned waivers of certain rights
under the Securities Acts should be permitted. When parties
of relatively equal bargaining power, large or small, knowingly
agree to waive certain rights with a reasoned appreciation for
what they are giving up, the courts should honor the agreement
of the parties to do so. Such agreements do not relieve the
parties from their obligation to comply with the law, but in-
stead limit the rights that the parties may exercise under the
law. When such agreements are entered into voluntarily and
knowingly, they should be upheld as they are not at odds with
the purpose of the anti-waiver provisions.

